Lapierre v. Garneau, 2002 CanLII 29036 (QC CS)
| Date: | 2002-03-26 |
| Docket: | 500-36-002675-018 |
| Citation: | Lapierre v. Garneau, 2002 CanLII 29036 (QC CS), <https://canlii.ca/t/1dgsd> retrieved on 2015-01-15 |
- Cited by 0 documents
SUPERIOR COURT |
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| CANADA | |||||||
| PROVINCE OF QUEBEC | |||||||
| DISTRICT OF | MONTREAL | ||||||
| No: | 500-36-002675-018 | ||||||
| DATE: | MARCH 26TH, 2002 | ||||||
| ______________________________________________________________________ | |||||||
| PRESIDING: | THE HONOURABLE | MR. JUSTICE J. FRASER MARTIN, J.S.C. | |||||
| ______________________________________________________________________ | |||||||
| Paul Lapierre | |||||||
| Applicant | |||||||
| v. | |||||||
| Judge Gilles Garneau | |||||||
| Respondant | |||||||
| and | |||||||
| Le Greffier de la Paix et de la Couronne | |||||||
| and | |||||||
| Attorney General of Quebec | |||||||
| Mise-en-cause | |||||||
| JUDGMENT | |||||||
| ______________________________________________________________________ | |||||||
[1] The Applicant applies for a writ of Prohibition aimed at enjoining the Respondent from proceeding further with his trial.
[2] He stands accused of the following offences :
“Entre le 20 mars 1965 et le 20 décembre 1965, à Montréal, district de Montréal, ont attenté à la pudeur d’une personne de sexe masculin à savoir : Claude MARLEAU, contrairement à l’article 148 du Code criminel canadien alors en vigueur.
Entre le 20 mars 1965 et le 20 décembre 1965, à Montréal, district de Montréal, ont commis un acte de grossière indécence avec une autre personne à savoir : Claude MARLEAU, contrairement à l’article 149 du Code criminel canadien alors en vigueur.”
[3] The relevant facts pertaining to this matter are set out in detail in the Application and more particularily in paragraphs 2 to 30. It will suffice to say that the trial proceeded with regard to both accused before Judge Garneau on the 29 and 30 October 2001. In the course of the hearing the co-accused René Dubé testified but the Applicant did not do so. At the end of the day on October 30 all parties intimated to the Respondant that they had no more evidence to call. Argument commenced the following day.
[4] It was in the light of certain observations made by Judge Garneau at this final argument stage together with his decision to acquit the co-accused Dubé that Me Peris decided to bring this application.
[5] After hearing counsel I indicated that I would like to peruse carefully the transcript of the trial in the light of their respective submissions in order to appreciate and evaluate the potential effect of the exchanges between Mr. Peris and judge Garneau within the context of the rules governing “reasonable apprehension of bias.”
[6] In the course of his argument Me Peris enunciated perhaps one of the best “gut” tests for the insuance of a prerogative writ when be argued that if the matter “troubled’ me then I should acquiesce to the Applicant’s demand.
[7] The first aspect which merits consideration are the consequences of the testimony of the complainant, during examination in chief, with regard to certain indicents which had been the subject of a number of complaints of indecent assault (as it was labelled at the time) in Ontario which, following a trial resulted in the acquittal of the Applicant.
[8] Such evidence, on its face, has the potential of being extremely damaging to the accused and conceivably, by ricochet, to the co-accused. Had this occurred before a jury it is more that idle conjecture than a motion for a mis-trial would have resulted.
[9] Mr. Peris entered a timely objection and his objection was satisfactorily dealt with by the trial judge who admonished the complainant, a lawyer, to limit his testimony to the circumstances of the accusation currently before the court. This, unfortunately was not the end of the matter although it would be inaccurate to fault the complainant alone. All counsel, including Mr. Peris continually permitted themselves recourse to testimony and statements relating to the Ontario charges in order either to undermine or bolster the credibility of the complainant, depending upon who was posing the question.
[10] As the trial progressed the judge began to tolerate wider and wider incursions into the circumstances of the Ontario investigation. Perhaps, in the circumstances, he felt that he had no choice and one can sympathize with him.
[11] The problem, of course, arises from the fact that the law of evidence with all its rules and trappings is, even in the best of circumstances, not a perfect tester and measurer of the truth. When the facts under examination are shrouded in the mists of time, as is the case here, it is far less perfect still.
[12] In paragraph 22 of the Application Mr. Peris cites the following exchange with the trial judge which I will reproduce in its entirety.
- Within the first minute of the Applicant’s arguements the trial judge has the following to say with respect to the Ontario acquittals and their use at Applicant’s trial at pages 19-21 :
La Cour :
Parce que concernant ce point-là, si on le vide tout de suite, n’oubliez pas que dans son témoignage, il mentionne qu’il y a eu plusieurs activités sexuelles avec monsieur Lapierre, mais que ça n’est qu’une seule fois qu’il a rencontré monsieur Dubé.
Me Peris:
Oui, votre Seigneurie, mais les…
La Cour:
Il l’a rencontré par après pour une question d’indentification…
Me Peris :
Mais ces plusieurs activités, votre Seigneurie, ça touche la question de la cause de Cornwall dans laquelle on ne peut pas prendre…
La Cour:
Non, non je ne le prends pas comme étant une question d’actes similaires ou encore que l’individu ait été acquitté, et cétéra suite à un procès. Ce n’est pas là-dessus. C’est dans son témoignage, dans son ensemble, il mentionne j’ai eu déjà plusieurs activités. Je l’ai… comme il aurait dit j’ai été au cinéma avec lui plusieurs fois. J’ai été au base-ball avec lui plusieurs fois. Par conséquent, il le connaissait.
Me Peris :
Ah non, il le connaissait, votre Seigneurie.
La Cour :
Il le connaissait beaucoup plus qu’il connaissait monsieur Dubé. Monsieur Dubé il ne l’a rencontré qu’une seule fois à cette époque-là, on est d’accord ?
Me Peris :
On est d’accord.
La Cour :
Tandis que monsieur Lapierre, et la preuve n’est pas contredite, que les rencontres entre monsieur Lapierre, pour quelque raison que ce soit, et le plaignant ont eu lieu à plusieurs reprises.
Me Peris :
Bien, disons…
La Cour :
Dans des autos, dans des motels et dans certains endroits parce que cette preuve-là n’est pas contredite là…
Me Peris :
Non, non.
La Cour :
… à moins que je rejette l’ensemble du témoignage de plaignant, moi, ce que j’ai, c’est une connaissance de l’accusé.
Me Peris :
Mais c’est une connaissance de l’accusé, votre Seigneurie, dans lequel il faut arriver que ce geste-là qui est… parce qu’il est accusé uniquement pour un geste, votre Seigneurie. Vous ne pouvez pas le prendre comme un acte similaire. Vous ne pouvez pas le prendre dans aucune autre façon.
La Cour :
Non, mais je peux… vous admettez que je peux le prendre qu’il le connaît très bien.
Me Peris :
Qu’il le connaît très bien.
La Cour :
Parce qu’il l’a rencontré plusieurs fois.
Me Peris :
Oui, votre Seigneurie, il l’a rencontré plusieurs fois, mais ça ne dit pas, votre Seigneurie…
La Cour :
La raison pour laquelle il le rencontre, je ne m’en servirai pas et je ne peux pas m’en souvenir pour en arriver à une culpabilité sur le geste qui a été posé en 65, mais je peux m’en servir de ce qu’il mentionne pour dire qu’il connaissait très bien l’accusé et cette preuve n’est pas contredite.”
[13] It was in reality only at this juncture that Me Peris presaged trouble and it was not long in coming. Although the judge did not articulate his reasons for acquitting Dubé a review of the transcript seems to suggest that while he may not have been satisfied, beyond a reasonnable doubt that the identity of Dubé had been established he was not prepared, at least at this juncture, to conclude that the incident had not occurred.
[14] The mere fact that the trial judge declined to articulate his reasons at this juncture for acquitting Dubé does not in itself trigger any entitlement to Prohibition. Doubtless, these reasons may have been of assistance to Me Peris in formulating his submissions but he was certainly capable of appreciating the various possibilities and addressing them. His real difficulty, I suspect, was that the case had taken a twist which he had not anticipated.
[15] However, that, at the stage at which it occured that twist can hardly be forged into an argument founded upon “reasonnable apprehension of bias.”
[16] I should however comment briefly on the exchange between Me Peris and the trial judge which is reproduced in Paragraph 29 of the Application.
- The trial Judge had the following to say with respect to the Applicant’s concern that the Court was making inferences which the Applicant submits contradict his own judgement of October 29th 2000, with respect to the Ontario acquittals :
“Et je n’ai jamais parler d’actes similaires ou rendu jugement (inaudible). Je vous dis tout de suite, la seule chose que je prends pour acquit c’est que l’accusé connaissait le plaignant pour s’être rencontrés à plusieurs reprise, si j’accepte le témoignage du plaignant. Lorsqu’il dit j’ai été agressé plusieurs fois soit dans une auto, soit dans une maison, soit dans la maison de retraite ou encore dans un motel. Je ne prends pas pour acquit qu’il y a eu agression sexuelle, il y a eu acquittement. Je prends pour acquit que si je le crois qu’il l’a rencontré à différents endroits, c’est tout. C’est comme s’il avait dit le témoin, j’ai été au cinéma à plusieurs reprises avec l’accusé. Ça ne démontre pas qu’il a vu tel film ou tel autre film, mais ça va démontrer qu’il est allé au cinéma, c’est tout. Alors j’ai jamais fait d’incidence par rapport à ce qu’il mentionne et pour lequel il a été acquitté et je vous dit tout de suite que si jamais qu’il y avait plaidoyer de culpabilité, pas de plaidoyer de culpabilité, mais déclaration de culpabilité, si c’est une circonstances aggravante qu’il y en ai eu plusieurs auparavant et ça devra être démontré.
(underlining mine)
[17] In view of the conclusion to which I have come I should, in considering this part of the argument, navigate with care. It will suffice to say that in the event that the judge enters a verdict of guilty it will be open for Me Peris to re-visit with him the import of what he stated in relation to “une circonstance aggravante”. I do not however believe on a full reading of the transcript that this is at all indicative of bias on the part of the trial judge.
[18] In the course of the hearing the parties placed before me the relevant jurisprudence relating to the issuance of prohibition and in particular the parameters governing the notion of “reasonnable apprehension of bias”. There is no dispute as to the import of these decisions and there is nothing to be gained by my embarking on a long analysis of them. The rules are clear but, in the final analysis, the exercise of discretion to grant or refuse prohibition is fact driven. On a balanced reading of the record there is no basis for the intervention of this court.
[19] For these reasons :
The Application is dismissed.
| __________________________________
J. FRASER MARTIN, J.S.C. |
|
| Me Julio Peris | |
| Counsel for Applicant | |
| Me Michel Pennou | |
| Crown Prosecutor | |