Crankshaw’s Criminal Code, Seventh Edition
A Commentary on the Criminal Law of Canada… 1959
The following are some relevant excerpts of and commentary on the Criminal Code of Canada which was in force (the 1954 code) when Pierre Elliott Trudau’s Liberal government revised the code in 1969 to decriminalize buggery
147. BUGGERY OR BESTIALITY. Every one who commits buggery or bestiality is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.
BUGGERY. Buggery, also called sodomy, is the carnal copulation against nature by human beings with each other or with a beast: Archbold’s Criminal Pleading & Practice (33rd ed., 1954), p. 118; 1 Russ. Cr. Law (10th ed.), 846; Stephen’s Digest of Criminal Law (9th ed.), 169; 1 Hale 669; 1 Hawk., c. 4; 1 East P.C. 480. Carnal knowledge per anum by a man of any man or woman is described in Archbold’s Criminal Pleading and Practice (p. 1118) as sodomy; carnal knowledge in any manner by a man or woman with a beast is bestiality. The word “buggery” comprehends both. Unlike rape, sodomy may be committed between two persons both of whom consent: R. v. Jellyman, 8 C. & P. 604; R. v. Allen (1848), 1 Denison C.C. 364; R. v. Bourne, 36 Cr. App. Rep. 125. The offence can be committed between husband and wife: R. v. Blanchard, 35 Cr. App. Rep. 183; R. v. Jellyman, supra, and the wife is a competent and compellable witness against her husband: R. v. Blanshard, supra; and see also Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, s. 4(2). There is a presumption that a boy under fourteen years of age is physically incapable of committing sodomy but he may be convicted of an indecent assault where his act is against the will of the other party: R. v. Hartlen, 2 C.C.C. 12, 30 N.S.R. 317. Where a male person assaults another person with intent to commit buggery or who indecently assaults another male person the fact that the person consents to the commission of the offence is not a defence to the charge where the act is committed upon a person under the age of fourteen years: Code, s. 132; R. v. Tatem, 15 Cr. App. Rep. 132. Boys under fourteen years of age cannot be accomplices in sodomy: R. v. Tatem, supra. If the offence is committed on a boy or girl under 14 years of age it would appear that the adult alone is guilty: 1 Hale 670, 3 Co. Inst. 59, 1 East P.C. 480.
The consent of the party upon whom the offence is committed is no defence to the charge of buggery: R. v. Lock, 12 Cox C.C. 244; Mascolo v. Montesanto, 61 Conn. 50, 29 Am. St. Rep. 170, but, if the party upon whom the offence is committed gives his consent, he is also guilty of the offence: R. v. Jellyman, 8 C. & P. 604, Warburton (6th ed.), 204, 34 E.C.L. 547; People v. Miller, 66 Cal. 468; Yom. v. Snow, 111 Mass. 411; Territory v. Mahaffey, 3 Mont. 112; People v. Deschessere, 69 N.Y. App. Div.. 217. Except in the case of a boy under fourteen years of age: R. v. Tatam, 15 Cr. App. Rep. 132.
Carnal knowledge is complete upon penetration to any, even the slightest degree, and even without the emission of seed: Code, s. 3(6) ; see also R. v. Reek-spear, 1 Mood. 342; R. v. Cozins, 6 C. & P. 351; R. v. Cox, 1 Mood. 337. To constitute the crime of buggery between human beings, there must be penetration “per anum”; and penetration in a child’s mouth does not constitute the offense. v. Jacobs, R. and R. 331.
It is an offence to aid and abet bestiality: R. v. Bourne, 36 Cr. App. Rep. :27 or cause a person to participate in an act of bestiality: R. v. Wishart, 20 C.P. 110 C.C.C. 129, 13 W.W.R. (N.S.) 477.
Any natural act may become an indecent act or even an act of gross indecency depending upon the time, the place and the circumstances as well as the facts under which it was committed. R. v. J., (1957) 21 W.W.R. (N.S.) 248 at p. 25 118 C.C.C. 30. An act which is inherently indecent according to the concepts and morals which presently prevail in this country (e.g. buggery or acts akin thereto may be an act of gross indecency within the meaning of s. 149 regardless of the time, place and other circumstances under which it is performed: R. v. K. H 1957) 22 W.W.R. (N.S.) , 118 C.C.C. 317.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT, ATTEMPTS. An assault with intent to commit buggery with another person is a separate and distinct offence under s. 148 of the Criminal Code and is punishable with ten years’ imprisonment and whipping. Where the complete commission of an offence charged is not proved but the evidence establishes an attempt to commit the offence, the accused may be convicted of the attempt: Code, s. 567. Where attempt to commit an offence is charged but the evidence establishes the commission of the complete offence the accused is not entitled to be acquitted but the jury may convict him of the attempt unless the judge presiding at the trial in his discretion discharges the jury from giving a verdict and directs that the accused be indicted for the complete offence: Code, s. 568(1), see also annotation “Attempts, assaults and intents”, 13 C.R. 186.
It has been held in England that a prior acquittal for buggery would be an answer to a subsequent charge for a lesser offence based on the same evidence and for which the accused might have been convicted on the first indictment: R. v. Barron,  2 K.B. 570, 10 Cr. App. Rep. 81. In this connection it will be noted that a count in an indictment is divisible and where the commission of the offence charged (as described in the enactment creating it, or, as charged in the count) includes the commission of another offence (whether punishable on indictment or on summary conviction) the accused may be convicted—(a) of an offence so included that is proved notwithstanding that the whole offence that is charged is not proved; or (b) of an attempt to commit an offence so included: Code, s. 569(1).
An assault with intent to commit an offence is sometimes classified as an attempt: John v. R., 15 S.C.R. 384.
CORROBORATION. It is desirable apart from any rule of law and whether the witnesses are accomplices or not that a warning should be given to the jury as to acting on the evidence of young boys: R. v. Cratchley, 9 Cr. App. Rep. 232; R. v. Southern, 22 Cr. App. Rep. 6. It has been held in England that a married woman who consented to her husband committing an unnatural offence against her was an accomplice and as such her evidence required corroboration at common law although her consent or non-consent was quite immaterial to the offence: P. v. Greenwood, 21. Cr. App. Rep. 186; R. v. Jellyman, 8 C. and P. 604.
Independent evidence of a previous similar offence against the same person has been held to be admissible as showing a course of conduct and has held to ho corroboration: R. v. Hartley, 28 Cr. App. Rep. 18.
EVIDENCE. The wife of the accused is a competent and compellable witness for the prosecution: Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, s. 4(2) ; R. v. Blanchard, 35 ‘r. App. Rep. 183.
Evidence is not admissible to prove that the prisoner has a general disposition to commit the offence: R. v. Cole, 1 Russ. Cr. Law (10th ed.), 848; R. v. Barron, 9 Cr. App. Rep. 236. But see for a different view R. v. Sims (1946), 31 Cr. App. Rep. 158, [19461 K.B. 531; but the Sim’s case has been critized by the Privy Council in R. v. Noor Mohamed,  A.C. 182, and later considered in R. v. Hall, [19521 K.B. 302, 35 Cr. App. Rep. 167. But a previous similar offence against the same person has been held admissible in evidence: R. v. Hartley, 28 Cr. App. Rep. 18.
A complaint is admissible as evidence only where it is made immediately after he offence or at the first convenient or reasonable opportunity thereafter: R. v.Elli ott, 49 C.C.C. 302;  2 D.L.R. 244, 62 O.L.R. 1 (See also R. v. Proteau, 33 B.C.R. 39) ; R. v. La Rochelle, 16 C.R. 51 at p. 62, 104 C.C.C. 349.
The appellant was convicted of sodomy with a youth of the age of nineteen. In the course of the trial evidence was tendered that immediately after the commission of the offence, (which took place in a police cell to which both the appellant and the prosecutor had been admitted when they applied at the police station for shelter), the prosecutor had written a note containing a complaint regarding what had taken place, and had pushed it under the cell door, where it was found by the police. The Judge admitted evidence both of the fact and of the particulars of the complaint as evidence of consistency of conduct tending to corroborate the prosecutor’s evidence:—Held, that the evidence was rightly admitted, the Court reserving the point whether, in cases of sexual offences against male persons, some age limit would have to be created within which complainants must come before evidence of their complaints could be given: R. v. Wannell, 17 Cr. App. Rep. 53, 87 J.P. 48 (R. v. Camelleri,  2 K.B. 122, 16 Cr. App. Rep. 162, foll’d. and extended.)
A party consenting to the commission of an offence of this kind. whether man or woman, is an accomplice, and requires corroboration: R. v. Jellyman, 8 C. and P. 640.
Accused was charged with buggery with a mentally deficient youth of bad character. A question arose as to the admissibility of conversations by the accused with other boys on the same subject. This evidence was admitted at the trial and accused was convicted and he appealed. Held, the conviction should be quashed on the ground that certain inadmissible evidence had been improperly introduced which was prejudicial to the accused: R. v. Hughes, 33 Cr. App. Rep. 59.
Accused was charged with committing buggery “by causing his wife to have connection with a dog”. Upon an investigation of the case by the police accused made certain statements of an inculpatory nature which had the effect of corroborating or strengthening the testimony of his wife. The case was tried by a judge alone sitting without a jury and several points of law were raised as to the admissibility of the statements made by the accused to the police and as to corroboration. Accused was convicted and he appealed. Held, there should be a new trial as certain inadmissible evidence had been adduced and the case was not one for applying s. 1014(2) (now s. 592(1) (b) (iii) of the Criminal Code: R. v. Wishart (1954), 20 C.R. 163, 110 C.C.C. 129, 13 W.W.R. (N.S.) 477.
Accused was convicted of an act of gross indecency under s. 206 (now s. 1491 of the Criminal Code. The evidence apart from that of the other person concerned in the case related to previous commissions of the same offence with other men. He appealed on the ground of wrongful admission of evidence. Held, the evidence of the previous offences was not admissible and the other male person concerned in the case was an accomplice and his evidence required corroboration and there should be a new trial: R. v. Boynton,  O.W.N. 11, 63 C.C.C. 95,  1 D.L.R. 687.
148. INDECENT ASSAULT ON MALE. Every male person who assaults another person with intent to commit buggery or who indecently assaults another male person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for ten years and to be whipped.
ASSAULT (INDECENT ON MALE). An indecent assault necessarily involves two elements—(a) a hostile act, and (b) circumstances of indecency: R. v. A.B., 22 C.R. 353, 113 C.C.C. 325. A hostile act, in the nature of an assault, may be committed in two ways—(a) by intentionally applying force to the person of another directly or indirectly; or (b) attempting or threatening, by an act or gesture, to apply force to the person of another (if the person making the threat has, or causes the other to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose) and in either case without the consent of the other or with such consent if it is obtained by fraud: R. v. Hall, 13 C.R. 36, 108 C.C.C. 183 An act which otherwise would have no indecent import and would constitute an assault only, may, by reason of the surrounding circumstances and by words spoken at the time, constitute an indecent assault: R. v. Quinton, [19471 S.C.R. 234 3 C.R. 6, 88 C.C.C. 231; R. v. Louie Chong, 23 C.C.C. 250, 32 O.L.R. 66; R. v. Edgett, 21 M.P.R. 144, 6 C.R. 42, 90 C.C.C. 274. It is not necessary that the act constituting the assault be in itself indecent in its nature, as it may when interpreted by the surrounding circumstances, including the words spoken at the time, amount to an indecent assault: R. v. Quinton (supra); Beal v. Kelley, 35 Cr. App. Rep. 128,  2 All E.R. 763, (1951), 2 T.L.R. 865. If a man indecently exposes himself and walks toward another with his person exposed and makes an indecent suggestion that can amount to an indecent assault: R. v. Rolfe (1952), 36 Cr. App. Rep. 4.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT (BUGGERY). It will be noted that s. 148 (above contains two separate and distinct offences—(a) an assault with intent to commit buggery; and (b) indecent assault on a male person. In view of this fact it may be necessary to consider whether, in view of the facts in any particular case, the indictment should contain two separate counts. An accused can, in a proper case be convicted of an attempt to commit an indecent assault: R. v. Cline (1956), C.R. 58, 115 C.C.C. 18; R. v. Boyer, 102 C.C.C. 128, 13 C.R. 184. Furthermore, an “attempt“ is an act done with intent to commit a crime and the converse is also true so it has been held that an assault committed with intent is an “attempt” to commit the offences: John v. R. (1888), 15 S.C.R. 384. Accused was charged with indecently assaulting a boy aged 12 years. There was evidence of a course of conduct with several other boys similar to that established by the evidence in the case of the boy 12 years of age. The Crown maintained that the evidence was sufficient to convict the accused of an indecent assault. Accused was convicted and he appealed alleging the evidence of similar acts was inadmissible. Held, the evidence of similar acts was proper under the circumstances but the facts were insufficient to constitute the full offence and the conviction should be one for an attempt to commit the offence and the sentence would be reduced: R. v. Cline, supra. Accused was convicted of attempting to commit buggery and the evidence showed that the accused had taken a boy into a closed stable and proposed an unnatural act to him. He then gave the boy money and spread out a blanket on the floor. After unbuttoning his trousers the accused took hold of the boy. He was then interrupted by the police who by arrangement with the boy were concealed in the stable. On appeal, held, the conviction should be affirmed as accused’s acts went beyond mere preparation and constituted an attempt: R. v. Delip Sing 1918) , 26 B.C.R. 390.
An act which is inherently indecent according to the concepts and moral which presently prevail in this country (e.g. buggery or acts akin thereto) may be an act of gross indecency within the meaning of s. 149 regardless of the time, place and other circumstances under which it is performed: R. v. K. & H., (1957 22 W.W.R. (N.S.) 86, 118 C.C.C. 317.
Accused was charged with having indecently assaulted a boy ten years of age. He asked the boy to go along with him in a truck which he was driving. After taking the boy to a canteen he reentered his truck with the boy and later indecently assaulted the boy in the truck. He then let the boy out of the truck at a place where the boy had left his bicycle. The boy made a complaint to his mother and the accused was arrested. The defence was an alibi. There was corroboration of the boy’s story and the accused was convicted. He appealed and a new trial was granted. The accused was again convicted and he again appealed,. Held, the appeal should be dismissed notwithstanding certain irregularities at the trial a: no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred: R. v. LaRochelle, 16 C.R. 51, 104 C.C.C. 349, 27 M.P.R. 262.
ATTEMPT. Every one who (having an intent to commit an offence) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out his intention is guilty of an “attempt to commit the offence” whether or not it was possible under the circumstances to commit the offence: Code, s. 24(1). The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence (and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence) is a question of law: Code, s. 24(2); Beaudoin v. The King, 5 C.R. 88. Acts which may not be sufficient to amount to an assault may, if they go beyond mere preparation, constitute an attempt to commit an indecent assault: R. v. Fiset,  R.L. 432; ; R. v. Cline (1956), 24 C.R. 58, 115 C.C.C. 18; R. v. Boyer, [1951J] O.W.N. 875, 13 C.R. 184, 102 C.C.C. 128; R. v. Fournier, 23 C.R. 363.
Accused was charged with indecently assaulting a boy aged 12 years. The acts of the accused from the first moment he approached the boy were not mere preparation and were not too remote to constitute an attempt. The magistrate who heard the case convicted the accused of the full offence and he appealed. Held, there was evidence of the intention of the accused to commit the offence of indecent assault as charged against him. The plan comprised a series of acts forming a clear cut pattern of conduct and he was guilty of an attempt to commit the offence: R. v. Cline (supra). It might be that in most cases the evidence sufficient to justify a conviction for an attempt to commit an indecent assault would also justify a conviction for the principal offence but that is not sufficient reason to hold that there is no such crime as an attempt to commit an indecent assault: R. v. Boyer, 102 C.C.C. 128, 13 C.R. 184, overruling R. v. Menary (1911), 23 O.L.R. 323, 18 C.C.C. 237, 13 Can. Abr. 386.
It is quite impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule for the drawing of the line between preparation and attempt: Kelley v. Hart,  1 W.W.R. 333, 61. C.C.C. 364,  2 D.L.R. 288; R. v. Snyder (1915), 34 O.L.R. 318, 24 C.C.C. 101, 25 D.L.R. 1. In almost every case where an attempt is charged there will be evidence of acts which are only preparatory. There is no obligation on the judge to discover the point at which the line is to be drawn between those acts and the acts which constitute the attempt. It is only in the case in which there are no such acts that it becomes necessary for the judge to so determine: R. v. Ging (1924), 57 N.S.R. 196.
It has been held on a charge of indecent assault on a male, evidence is not admissible to prove an attempt by the accused of a similar offence at another time with another male: R. v. Iman Din, 18 C.C.C. 82. But see for a different view R. v. Cline (1956), 24 C.R. 58, 115 C.C.C. 18.
Upon the trial of a charge of indecent assault on a boy, evidence of the complaint made by the boy to his parents shortly after the alleged offence was committed is admissible: R. v. Camelleri, 91 L.J.K.B. 671,  2 K.B. 122, 16 Cr. App. Rep. 162; R. v. LaRochelle (No. 2), 16 C.R. 51 at p. 62, 30 M.P.R. 262, 104 C.C.C. 349.
149. ACTS OF GROSS INDECENCY. Every one who commits an act of gross indecency with another person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years.
ACTS OF GROSS INDECENCY. It is an offence for one male person to commit an act of gross indecency with another male person: Code, s. 149 (above). It will be noted that s. 149 is derived from old s. 206 of the previous Code but the form of the section has been changed. It formerly read as follows: “206. Every male person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to five years’ imprisonment and to be whipped who in public or private commits or is a party to the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any acts of gross indecency with another male person. “For an interpretation of the wording of old s. 206, see R. v. Hayward,  O.W.N. 734, 22 C.R. 17, 113 C.C.C. 83.
Any natural act may become an indecent act or even an act of gross indecency depending upon the time, the place and the circumstances as well as the facts under which it was committed. R. v. J. (1957), 21 W.W.R. (N.S.) 248 at p. 251, 118 C.C.C. 30. An act which is inherently indecent according to the concepts and morals which presently prevail in this country (e.g. buggery or acts akin thereto) may be an act of gross indecency within the meaning of s. 149 regardless of the time, place and other circumstances under which it is performed: R. v. K. c4 H. (1957), 22 W.W.R. (N.S.) 86, (1957) 26 C.R. 186, 118 C.C.C. 317, distinguishing R. v. J. (supra).
Accused was charged on an indictment containing two counts—(a) that he did being a male person procure or attempt to procure the commission of an act of gross indecency by one G.F. another male person; and (b) that he did being a male person procure or attempt to procure the commission of an act of gross indecency by one B.P. another male person. Accused was convicted and he appealed alleging that the indictment was bad as each count charged two separate offences. Held, while it is possible to attempt to procure another person to commit an act of gross indecency without procuring that person to commit the act, it is not possible to procure without first attempting to do so and consequently a count charging that accused did procure or attempt to procure the commission of an act of gross indecency is not void for duplicity or uncertainty: (supra). It is possible that there may be gross indecency by one person without actual physical contact taking place with the other male person acting in concert with him. There need not be physical contact to constitute gross indecency: R. v. Hunt and Badsey, 34 Cr. App. Rep. 135,  2 All E.R. 291. If there is evidence from which an inference might be drawn that they were not so acting in concert then special instructions must be given to the jury as to their verdict: R. v. Hornby c Peaple,  2 All E.R. 487. Where two persons are charged jointly it does not follow that both must be convicted or both acquitted but a proper direction to the jury is necessary: R. v.Pearce, 35 Cr. App. Rep. 17,  1 All E.R. 493,  1 T.L.R. 412; R. v. Jones,  1 Q.B. 4, 65 L.J.M.C. 28, 73 L.T. 584, 18 Cox C.C. 207.
It is not essential to the offence of committing an act of gross indecency with another male person that such other male person shall also be legally capable of committing the offence. The law applies although the person with whom the indecent act was alleged to have been committed was a boy under the age of seven and therefore incompetent to commit a crime. There must, however, be affirmative evidence of the act and not merely disbelief of accused’s statement denying the same made to the police in his testimony, when the child’s evidence was not taken: p Horn, 40 C.C.C. 117. Where a prisoner is charged with a series of indecent acts against children (whether boys or girls) the fact that they have all complained of the same sort of conduct on the part of the prisoner towards them is admissible on the charge respecting any one child to rebut a defence of innocent association: R. v. Hall, 35 Cr. App. Rep. 167, explaining R. v. Sims, 31 Cr. App. Rep. 158 at p. 169 and referring to the case of R. v. Thompson, (H. of L.) 87 L.J.K.B. 478,  A.C. 221; R. v. Cline, supra. But where the only question is whether the accused committed the very act charged, (it not being a case of an ambiguous act, which might be innocent or guilty according to the intent, nor a case of identity), evidence of the commission of similar acts is not admissible. If, however, it were admissible its admissibility would not be affected by the incidental disclosure of other offences: R. v. Boynton, 63 C.C:C..95; R. v. Shellaker, [19141 I N.B. 414.
The appellant was charged with gross indecency with two boys. He set up an alibi as a defence. Evidence of his identity with the man who committed the offence was given. In addition, evidence was admitted that on his arrest three days after the crime had been committed powder puffs were found on him, and that indecent photographs of naked boys were found at his house:—Held, that this evidence was admissible as tending to establish the identity of the appellant with the guilty man, inasmuch as the latter would be likely to be in possession of such articles as implements of seduction: R. v. Thompson, 86 L.J.K.B. 1321,  2 K.B. 630, 117 L.T. 575, 81 J.P. 266, 61 S.J. 647, 33 T.L.R. 506, affirmed in House of Lords, S7 L.J.K.B. 478,  A.C. 221.
The appellant was charged with the commission of acts of gross indecency with a boy:—Held, that evidence of photographs of nude boys found on him or at his lodgings was admissible to shew the practice resorted to by him, in the same way as the possession of tools by a burglar, or of instruments by an abortionist, is evidence as shewing the possession of appliances and instruments used by persons engaged in these particular crimes: R. v. Twiss, 88 L.J.K.B. 20,  2 K.B. 853, 119 L.T. 680, 83 J.P. 23, 13 Cr. App. Rep. 177, 35 T.L.R. 3.
It is an offence, under the English law, for one male person to procure the commission by a second male of an act of gross indecency with the first mentioned person: R. v. Jones et al., 18 Cox C.C. 207; R. v. Cope, 16 Cr. App. Rep. 77, 86 J.Y. 78, 38 T.L.R. 243.
A fellow-soldier of the appellant committed acts of indecency with a boy and subsequently told the appellant what had occurred. The appellant then wrote letters to the boy saying that “my friend who met you last week wishes me to see you,“ and asking the boy to meet him, but containing no indecent invitation or solicitation:—Held, that the jury, in considering whether the writing of the letters constituted an attempt to procure the boy to commit an act of gross indecency, were entitled to look at the circumstances in which they were written and conclude that the boy would read into them an invitation to repeat with the appellant the offence which he had committed with the first man. The letters never reached the boy, being intercepted by his mother:—Held, that this fact did not prevent the writing of them from constituting an attempt: R. v. Cope, 16 Cr. App. Rep. 77, 86.J.P. 78. 66 S.J. 406, 38 T.L.R. 243 (R. v. Banks, 12 Cox C.C. 393, and R. v. Ransford, Li Cox C.C. 9 adopted.)
The appellant was convicted of inciting W. to procure the commission by certain male unknown persons of acts of gross indecency with him, the appellant:—Held, that it was unnecessary that the male persons to be procured should be ascertained individuals in the contemplation of one or other of the parties, and the conviction was good. Held, further, that it was immaterial that the incitement of W. to procure the commission of the acts of gross indecency by male persons might have involved W.’s inciting such male persons to commit such acts, as the appellant’s conduct was not a mere incitement to W. to incite such male persons but constituted an incitement to W. to procure male persons to commit the acts in question: R. v. Bentley, 39 T.L.R. 105.
It has been held that where on a summary trial for attempted gross indecency between males, the only evidence for the prosecution, if credited, would prove buggery, the indecency charge should be dismissed: R. v. Landlow, 38 C.C.C. 54.
The appellant was acquitted on a charge of sodomy. He was then indicted for committing an act of gross indecency with the same male person, to which he pleaded autrefois acquit: Held, that as the verdict of acquittal on the charge of sodomy did not involve an acquittal on the charge of gross indecency, because neither the act of penetration, which is an essential element of the charge of sodomy, nor the intention to penetrate, which is an essential element of an attempt to commit that offence, is an essential element of the offence of gross indecency, and that as it was conceded that the appellant could not in law have been convicted of gross indecency on the same serious charge, the plea of autrefois acquit was not proved: R. v. Barron, 83 L.J.K.B. 786, C19141 2 K.B. 570, 10 Cr. App. Rep. 81.
Accused was charged with gross indecency and it was admitted by the Crown that the person with whom the offence was committed was an accomplice but there was no corroboration of the accomplice’s evidence. Accused was convicted and he appealed. Held, corroboration was not essential to the validity of the conviction: R. v. Williams (1914), 7 O.W.N. 426, 23 C.C.C. 339, 19 D.L.R. 676.