Justice Colin McKinnon (Appendix A to CJC complaint)

[Appendix A to complaint filed with the Canadian Judicial Council regarding Justices James Chadwick and Colin McKinnon and the Jacques Leduc sex abuse trial]

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Appendix A to MacEachern letter of 09 April 2001

Justice Colin McKinnon

1. Justice Colin McKinnon did not recuse himself.

a. Justice McKinnon should not have presided at the Leduc trial.

In 1993, Jacques Leduc (then acting as legal counsel to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Alexandria-Cornwall) and Claude Shaver (then Chief of Police for the Cornwall Police Services) conspired with others to terminate a criminal investigation into allegations of sexual assault against a local Roman Catholic priest. At or about that time Mr. Leduc was party to arranging a financial payout to the alleged victim. It was later discovered that that payout included a gag order.

Shortly after the victim received the diocesan payout, Perry Dunlop, then a Constable with the Cornwall Police Services, discovered that his police force had terminated a criminal investigation into the allegations against the priest. As required by the Ontario Child and Family Services Act, Constable Dunlop advised the Children’s Aid Society (CAS) of the allegations and then disclosed the victim statement to that agency. Subsequently, Colin D. McKinnon, acting as legal counsel to the Cornwall Police Services, recommended that Constable Dunlop be charged under the Police Service Services Act for his actions. Shortly thereafter, Colin D. McKinnon, acting as legal counsel to former Chief Shaver, attempted to malign and discredit Constable Dunlop for his actions. Several years later, at the behest of Constable Dunlop, an OPP probe named Project Truth commenced an investigation into allegations of cover-up of a paedophile ring in Cornwall.

The stated mandate of Project Truth was to investigate historic and on-going paedophile activity in Cornwall. According to the mandate, the alleged suspects in the investigation included “prominent and respected citizens of Cornwall” including lawyers, clergy, probation officers, teachers and “a former Chief of Police.” According to the mandate, Project Truth would also investigate allegations that “suspects were able to terminate investigations and prosecutions against them by abusing their positions of trust” and that “the Crown Attorney, the Diocese of Cornwall, and the Cornwall Police Services conspired to obstruct justice in these matters.”

In other words, Justice McKinnon provided legal counsel to former Chief Shaver, a man suspected of conspiring to obstruct justice regarding the initial allegations of sex abuse. Furthermore, Justice McKinnon provided legal counsel to the Cornwall Police Service, an agency suspected of conspiring to obstruct with the Diocese of Cornwall (Jacques Leduc) regarding the initial allegations of sex abuse.

I respectfully submit that any “reasonable” person would deduce that in taking the Leduc trial, Justice McKinnon placed himself in a serious conflict of interest. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that the name Perry Dunlop is virtually synonymous with Project Truth. Therefore, I respectfully submit that, due to his prior activities as legal counsel to former Chief Shaver and the Cornwall Police Services, and due to his active attempts to legally discredit the conduct of Constable Dunlop, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to bear bias at a Project Truth trial. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due his attempts to vindicate the actions of former Chief Shaver and the Cornwall Police Service in an alleged cover-up, and due to the fact that that alleged cover-up entailed explicit attempts by Mr. Leduc to stifle sex abuse allegations against a local priest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to acquit Mr. Leduc. Justice McKinnon should have recused himself. He did not.

b. Justice McKinnon declined an opportunity to address his serious conflict of interest and recuse himself in the early days of the trial. At that time, Dick Nadeau, the operator of the projecttruth2.com web site, posted an article stating in part:

Justice McKinnon is relatively new to the bench, some four years I think. He is said to be a good judge. But prior to becoming a judge, he had a successful law practice. He was in fact the lawyer for our former Chief of Police Claude Shaver. He knows all about cover-ups over the Charlie/Ken Seguin affair. He knows about Cornwall’s troubles. He knows that Shaver is a paedophile and yet, had him as a client. Did he check his biases and prejudices at the door? So what does this judge bring to this trial? Am I concerned? You bet I am. Should he as the lawyers say, recuse himself from the bench? Can we expect him to be “fair and impartial”?

In response to the above posting, Justice McKinnon called Mr. Nadeau “a dangerous man” and charged him with contempt of court (22 January 2001).

I respectfully submit that, upon reading the above referenced posting on the web site, Justice McKinnon should have recognized his vulnerability. He should have recused himself. He did not.
Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon abused his judicial authority by charging Mr. Nadeau with contempt of court.

c. Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself when the name Perry Dunlop was introduced into testimony 07 February 2001. During his prior involvement as legal counsel to former Chief Shaver and the Cornwall Police Services, Justice McKinnon undertook actions directed at the person and conduct of Constable Dunlop. Those actions included, but were not limited to, the following:

• Justice McKinnon advised the Cornwall Police Services to initiate legal action against Constable Dunlop through the Police Services Act;

• When Constable Dunlop was exonerated of the above charges, Justice McKinnon advised that the decision be appealed;

• Acting as legal counsel to retired Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon threatened legal action against Carson Chisholm whom he knew to be the brother-in-law of Constable Mr. Dunlop;

• Acting as legal counsel to retired Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon threatened legal action against the Seaway News for, in part, printing a paragraph congratulating Perry Dunlop for giving a copy of the sexual abuse complaint to the Children’s Aid Society; and

• Acting as legal counsel to retired Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon attempted to malign and discredit Constable Dunlop by advising the Seaway News that Constable Dunlop was then “under investigation for misconduct contrary to the Police Services Act.”

I respectfully submit that, as witnessed above, during his prior activities as legal counsel in Cornwall, Justice McKinnon displayed animus against the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop. Consequently, Justice McKinnon should have recused himself when the name Perry Dunlop was first introduced into testimony. He did not.

d. Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself when defence honed in on the nature of a witness contact with Constable Dunlop. In fact, shortly after the name Perry Dunlop was introduced into testimony, the Crown objected that defence was eliciting hearsay regarding the Dunlop contact and requested a voir dire. Justice McKinnon overruled and permitted a limited line of questioning. Furthermore, Justice McKinnon personally drew attention to a witness statement which he thought might indicate a contradiction in the witness’ testimony.

I respectfully submit that throughout this entire portion of testimony Justice McKinnon never questioned defence as to the merit or relevance of occupying court time to pursue a particular witness contact. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, as evidenced by his rulings, Justice McKinnon aided and abetted defence to hone in and focus on a benign and irrelevant witness contact with former Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in drawing attention to what he thought was a contradiction in the witness’ testimony, Justice McKinnon willfully attempted to assist the defence. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, throughout this entire portion of testimony — despite his prior legal involvement with former Constable Dunlop — Justice McKinnon never once indicated that the name Perry Dunlop rang a bell. Justice McKinnon should have recused himself. He did not.

e. Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself after defence filed an application for stay on 14 February 2001. The application for stay was filed one week after a victim’s mother testified that she had initiated a brief contact with Constable Perry Dunlop. The witness testified that she broke down at a welfare office because she just did not know what to do or where to turn regarding her son’s allegation that he was sexually molested by Mr. Leduc. The witness testified that a clerk at the welfare office suggested that she contact Constable Dunlop. A brief contact was made. The witness further testified that Constable Dunlop made one other call to her home to enquire about her son. A Project Truth officer was at her home when this contact was made. She informed the officer that she was speaking to Constable Dunlop.

As is typical of many communities, Cornwall had no agencies to provide guidance and support to male victims of sexual assault. Under those circumstances, the witness’ contact with Constable Dunlop was an effort by a distraught mother to seek guidance and/or support from anyone familiar with issues of male sexual molestation. Constable Dunlop was known to be such a person.

This understandable, brief and benign contact of a distraught mother with Constable Dunlop mushroomed into defence allegations of deliberate non-disclosure of a witness contact with Constable Dunlop. Defence relied on hearsay to charge that contact with Mr. Dunlop was an issue because Dunlop “is a man who’s involved with the corruption of the integrity of witnesses’ testimony.” Defence again relied on hearsay to allege that Mr. Dunlop “made unauthorized contact with complainant witnesses on Project Truth cases” and coached witnesses “to give false or exaggerated testimony.” In other words, in filing for the application to stay, defence focussed on the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop.

I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to exonerate Project Truth suspects by maligning former Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to, and did, permit and readily embrace defamatory hearsay regarding the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop. Justice McKinnon should have recused himself when the application for stay was filed. He did not.

f. Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself prior to the commencement of the motion for stay 19 February 2001. The motion for stay was booked for one week. It was clear that the motion would focus largely on the conduct and person of former Constable Dunlop. It was also clear to courtroom observers that, in order to make the charge of non-disclosure relevant, defence would have to vilify Mr. Dunlop.

I respectfully submit that, because of his demonstrable animus against the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop ( ref. 1c), Justice McKinnon should not even have entertained the thought of presiding over the motion for stay. He should have recused himself. He did not.

g. Justice McKinnon should never have been selected/assigned to preside at the Leduc trial. For the past eight years the city of Cornwall has been rocked by allegations of paedophilia and related allegations of misconduct and cover-up involving members of the legal profession, the Roman Catholic Church, and the local police. Consequently, it was decided that all Project Truth trials would be handled by justices and Crowns residing outside the Cornwall jurisdiction. This decision was apparently made to ensure impartiality and allay citizen’s fears of judicial bias.

The Leduc trial was a Project Truth trial. Presumably Justice McKinnon was brought in from from Ottawa to ensure impartiality and to allay public fears about cover-up and potential judicial bias. In light of what is now known of Justice McKinnon’s prior activity in Cornwall, this begs two questions: (1) Was Justice McKinnon screened for prior legal/social activity in Cornwall? (2) Was Justice McKinnon asked if he had any prior legal and/or social dealings in Cornwall?

I respectfully question the process by which Justice McKinnon was selected/assigned to the Leduc trial. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that selecting/assigning Justice McKinnon to preside over the Leduc trial made a mockery of a process implemented, at least in part, to allay fears of judicial bias. Finally, I respectfully submit that, rightly or wrongly, selecting/assigning Justice McKinnon to preside over the Leduc trial has simply served to confirm public fears of rampant judicial bias.

2. Justice Colin McKinnon removed himself from the motion to stay only after a witness confronted him with concrete evidence of his, McKinnon’s, serious conflict of interest.

Justice McKinnon was prepared to preside over the motion to stay (19 February 2001). Mr. Dick Nadeau, the operator of the projecttruth2.com web site, was called as the first witness. Before taking the stand, Mr. Nadeau asked leave to address the court. Mr. Nadeau advised that he, Nadeau, had been cited for contempt by Justice McKinnon for previously questioning Justice McKinnon’s bias and possible conflict of interest. Mr. Nadeau then stated that he had letters written in 1994 in which Justice McKinnon threatened to sue Carson Chisholm, Perry Dunlop’s brother-in-law. Mr. Nadeau asked justice McKinnon to recuse himself.

Justice McKinnon appeared puzzled and said that he had no memory of such letters. He asked to see them. When the said letters were produced from a binder in the court they were handed over to the Crown. Justice McKinnon asked that they be read into the record. Both letters were written on legal letterhead. Both letters were signed by Colin D. McKinnon Q.C. Both letters were re Claude Shaver. One letter, dated 14 October 1994, was addressed to the publisher of the Seaway News. The other, dated 18 October 1994, was addressed to Carson Chisholm. Both letters threaten legal action. The letter to the Seaway News shows that Justice McKinnon was very familiar with the allegations of cover-up of sexual abuse allegations. It also shows that he was very familiar with the actions of the Cornwall Police Service and the conduct and person of Constable Perry Dunlop.

After the letters were read into the record, Justice McKinnon said that his memory was “refreshed somewhat.” Shortly thereafter, Justice McKinnon indicated that “this was all very far out of my memory but I’m now refreshed” and added that it was no secret that he acted for Claude Shaver and the Cornwall Police Services.

Following a brief recess, Justice McKinnon advised that he may have forgotten other prior involvement regarding Dunlop and the Cornwall Police Service and that “the right thing for me to do” would be to review files at the police station “just to see whether there’s anything that may be there that could at some other time in this trial have an effect.”

The following morning, Justice McKinnon reported that, although he had not yet accessed his own files, he found sufficient information at the police station to “refresh” his memory and that he had indeed had other involvement. That involvement entailed advising the Cornwall Police Service to initiate a series of legal actions against Constable Dunlop for disclosing the victim statement to the CAS. Justice McKinnon advised that Justice Chadwick would hear the application for stay.

I respectfully submit that, as evidenced above, until he was confronted with tangible proof to the contrary, Justice McKinnon wilfully feigned ignorance of his significant prior dealings with former Chief Shaver, the Cornwall Police Service and, in consequence, Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in feigning ignorance of his dealings with former Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon was mindful that he should not have been presiding.

3. Justice McKinnon willfully attempted to feign ignorance of Perry Dunlop.

Justice McKinnon made a number of comments and/or queries regarding Perry Dunlop after his name, Dunlop’s, was introduced into testimony on 07 February 2001. While most of those comments or queries implied a personal ignorance of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop, others belied such ignorance. Examples of Justice McKinnon’s contradictory commentary include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. When the application for stay was filed (14 February 2001), Justice McKinnon repeatedly quizzed the Crown regarding Constable Dunlop’s contact with witnesses in other sex abuse cases. Those questions included, but were not limited to, the following:

• “But I’m just wondering, through these years and all these [contacts with witnesses in other cases] was Constable Dunlop an officer still with Cornwall Police? Was he being paid?”

• “But if he was holding himself out as a counsellor. Was he holding himself out as a counsellor at the same time he was a police officer sworn to [investigate]? Is that at the same time. . .Is that under investigation?…Is it ongoing?”

I respectfully submit that, in this instance, despite his first-hand knowledge of Constable Perry Dunlop, Justice McKinnon attempted to feign ignorance of the conduct and person of former Perry Dunlop.

b. On 15 February 2001, Justice McKinnon discussed an article which appeared in 19 February 2001 edition of The Report, a national weekly magazine. The article “No Closure in Cornwall” gave an overview of events which have transpired in Cornwall since former Constable Dunlop first happened on the sex abuse allegations against Father Charles MacDonald. The three-page article referenced the charges laid against Dunlop under the Ontario Police Services Act. and the subsequent appeal.

Justice McKinnon expressed his “tremendous concerns” that the Report article was “adulatory of Mr. Dunlop.” Furthermore, Justice McKinnon stated “We are not living in Salem” and indicated that the court cannot permit continuance of pieces talking about alleged cover-up.

I respectfully submit that, despite his attempts to feign ignorance the previous day, Justice McKinnon’s above commentary was indicative of first-hand prejudicial knowledge of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop.

c. On 19 February 2001, after Dick Nadeau, the operator of the projecttruth2.com website confronted Justice McKinnon with two letters showing conflict of interest (ref. Appendix A para 2 above). At that time, Justice McKinnon stated: “When I came to this case there was no suggestion Dunlop would be involved in any way.”

I respectfully submit that, in making the above statement, Justice McKinnon was trying to extricate himself from a difficult situation by indicating that, had he known Perry Dunlop would be involved in the trial he, McKinnon, would not have presided. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in making such a statement, Justice McKinnon inadvertently demonstrated a first-hand knowledge of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that in making the above statement Justice McKinnon was aware that he had been caught in a serious conflict of interest.

d. On 20 February 2001, after he had checked files at the police station, Justice McKinnon stated: “When the name Perry Dunlop came up in this trial, it was certainly going around in my mind. It certainly rang a bell.”

I respectfully submit that, despite previous statements to the contrary (ref. Appendix A paras 3b and 3c above), Justice McKinnon was attempting to indicate that, until he checked the files at the police statement, he had no recall of his first-hand knowledge of the conduct and person of former Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Justice McKinnon was trying to rationalize why he had not recused himself thirteen days earlier when the name Perry Dunlop was first introduced into testimony. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that it is extraordinary that Justice McKinnon could claim to have forgotten his radical legal counsel to the Cornwall Police Service regarding the conduct of Constable Dunlop.

e. On 20 February 2001, only moments after saying the name Perry Dunlop “rang a bell,” Justice McKinnon stated: “None of us foresaw, in this case, that Perry Dunlop would be involved.”

I respectfully submit that once again Justice McKinnon inadvertently demonstrated his first-hand knowledge of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop (ref. A3c). Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, until he was publicly confronted by a witness with tangible evidence to the contrary, Justice McKinnon wilfully attempted to feign ignorance of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in attempting to feign ignorance of former Constable Dunlop, Justice McKinnon was mindful that he should not have been presiding. Finally, I respectfully and seriously question Justice McKinnon’s motive for remaining on the bench after 07 February 2001.

4. Justice McKinnon denied the victims their right to trial by jury.

Justice McKinnon claimed that information posted on an internet site broke a publication ban and thereby poisoned the jury pool (17 January 2001). Despite the fact that the information posted dealt with motions and technicalities regarding jury selection, Justice McKinnon claimed the material on the site “compromised the rights of both the Crown and the defence to a trial by jury.” Justice McKinnon supported the defence request for trial by judge. The victims in the Leduc trial were denied their right to trial by jury.

I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest Justice McKinnon was predisposed to preside at the Leduc trial in a manner favourable to the defendant. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that a trial by judge alone was, under the circumstances, favourable to the accused. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon used the internet incident as an excuse to proceed with a trial by judge. Finally, I respectfully submit that, if concerns that one internet posting could contaminate the entire jury pool in a city which has been awash with talk of paedophiles, and cover-ups and crooked lawyers for the past eight years, Justice McKinnon should have relocated the trial to another jurisdiction. He did not.

5. Justice McKinnon was predisposed to grant an application for stay which was based solely on the benign contact of a victim’s mother with former Constable Perry Dunlop.

a. During his prior legal involvements in Cornwall, Justice McKinnon engaged in legal actions directed at the conduct and person of Constable Dunlop. Those legal actions maligned the person and discredited the conduct of Constable Dunlop for attempting to ensure that sexual abuse allegations were properly investigated.

I respectfully submit that, during his prior legal actions in Cornwall, Justice McKinnon exhibited animus against the conduct and person of Constable Perry Dunlop. Consequently, I respectfully submit that Justice McKinnon was predisposed to discredit any actions of Constable Dunlop and to accept any hearsay or speculation regarding his conduct.

b. Defence filed an application for stay (14 February 2001) after a victim’s mother testified (07 February 2001) that she had initiated a brief and, I respectfully submit, benign, contact with former Constable Perry Dunlop. Defence, however, argued that “the defence has been irretrievably prejudiced” by what it termed “deliberate non-disclosure” of that contact.

I respectfully submit that a benign witness contact with former Constable Dunlop has no bearing whatever on whether or not Mr. Leduc did or did not sodomize and otherwise sexually molest the plaintiffs in this trial. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that a witness contact with Constable Dunlop can be construed as malignant only if one embraces the unsubstantiated, defamatory and fallacious innuendo that Perry Dunlop is a conspirator who fabricates stories of sexual abuse, forces men to perjure themselves, and willingly forfeits his career, financial security, friendships, and reputation for the pleasure of seeing innocent men charged and convicted. I respectfully submit that, due to his prior conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to, and did, embrace such fallacious innuendo without question.

c. During the application to stay, Justice McKinnon cut into the Crown’s address. When the Crown said “the defence will be arguing that because of a propensity on the part of Constable Dunlop to intervene,” Justice McKinnon cut in: “To intervene with witnesses and infect them or have them exaggerate their testimony or move forward with legal proceedings.”

I respectfully submit that the application for stay was permitted to proceed because Justice McKinnon was predisposed, as evidenced by his own words, to vilify the actions of Mr. Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Justice McKinnon’s demonstrable bias and defamatory and unsubstantiated statements should have sufficed to have him removed from the bench and a mistrial declared.

6. Justice McKinnon allowed victims to be harangued on the stand.

Throughout the proceedings, Justice McKinnon displayed bias and prejudice by favouring objections put forth by the defence. Such examples of bias and prejudice included, but were not limited to, the following:

• During cross-examination of the first victim the tearful, humiliated and confused 20-year old victim was mercilessly harangued by the defence. When the Crown attempted to object, Justice McKinnon stated: “This witness is 20 years old. He is not a child.”

• When the Crown attempted to object again, Justice McKinnon snapped: “I’m going to suggest that you’re on your feet too much. Quite frankly I find it disturbing.”

I respectfully submit that both interventions referenced above reflect Justice McKinnon’s lack of empathy for male victims of sex abuse. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his prior conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon’s attitude toward the victims was indicative of a predisposed prejudice for the accused paedophile, Mr. Leduc.

Continue to Appendix C (Chadwick)